Katsina peace deal has become the phrase on every newsroom desk in Nigeria since the surprising agreement was signed in early 2026. The deal, brokered by local elders and state officials, permits a notorious bandit group to purchase basic supplies – notably biscuits – and to organise their pilgrimage to Hajj, while still retaining their weapons. Photographer Terna Iwar, whose images have recently run in The Nigerian Scam, captured the stark reality of this arrangement, offering a visual narrative that challenges the conventional wisdom on disarmament and peacebuilding. What the Katsina peace deal really entails The agreement, signed in March 2026, was the result of months of back‑channel talks between the Katsina State government, traditional rulers, and the leader of the Garkuwan Daji bandit faction. Rather than demanding an immediate surrender of arms – a demand that previous attempts had seen crumble under mistrust – the accord focused on humanitarian gestures: a monthly allowance of staple food items, a small cash stipend, and official permission for the group’s members to travel to Saudi Arabia for Hajj. In return, the bandits pledged to cease attacks on civilian convoys, schools, and farms within a 50‑kilometre radius of the state capital. They also agreed to open a communication line with the police for any grievances, a clause that, while symbolic, marks a departure from the all‑or‑nothing approach of earlier cease‑fires. Critics argue that allowing armed men to keep their guns undermines the rule of law. Supporters, however, point to the reduction in kidnappings and cattle rustling reported in the first three months after the deal. The reality on the ground, as Iwar’s photographs show, is a mixture of relief, suspicion, and lingering tension. Terna Iwar’s lens: documenting the paradox Terna Iwar, a Lagos‑born photojournalist who grew up in the northern city of Kano, travelled to Katsina in April 2026 to document the first week of the agreement’s implementation. His images, now circulating widely on social media and in print, avoid sensationalist dramatics. Instead, they focus on everyday moments that reveal the human side of a conflict often reduced to statistics. One striking photograph shows a line of men in traditional flowing robes – the baban riga – waiting outside a modest shop that sells biscuits and tea. Their faces are partially hidden by scarves, but the weariness in their eyes is palpable. In another frame, a young boy hands a biscuit to an elderly woman, both smiling despite the backdrop of a cracked wall that once bore graffiti warning of bandit raids. “I wanted to capture the ordinary,” Iwar explains. “When you see a bandit buying a biscuit, you realise they are still people, not just headlines. The paradox is that they can plan for Hajj, a sacred journey, while still holding guns. That tension is what I tried to show.” Why biscuits? The symbolism of food in peace talks Food has long been a diplomatic tool in African conflict resolution. In the 1990s, the Liberian civil war saw cease‑fire talks mediated over shared meals, and in South Sudan, humanitarian aid packages often preceded peace negotiations. In Katsina, biscuits were chosen for their practicality – they are non‑perishable, easy to distribute, and culturally familiar as a snack for travelers. The biscuit allowance, worth roughly 5,000 naira per household per month, is modest but significant in a region where inflation has pushed basic staples beyond reach for many families. By guaranteeing a steady supply, the state hopes to create a small but tangible incentive for the bandits to honour the cease‑fire. Moreover, the act of buying biscuits in a public market subtly re‑integrates the fighters into civilian life. It signals to the community that the bandits are now customers, not just combatants, fostering a sense of normalcy that can be a stepping stone toward broader reconciliation. The Hajj clause: faith as a peace lever Allowing the bandits to perform Hajj was a calculated move by the Katsina administration. Islam is the dominant faith in the region, and the pilgrimage holds immense spiritual weight. By granting permission, the government tapped into a deep cultural aspiration, offering a form of moral capital that outweighs the immediate security concerns of disarmament. In practice, the clause required the bandits to register with the Ministry of Pilgrims Affairs, submit biometric data, and obtain travel documents. The process, overseen by a joint committee of religious scholars and security officials, created a rare point of contact between the state and the armed group. Since the first group of 12 bandits departed for Mecca in August 2026, there have been no reported incidents of the group attacking civilians during the pilgrimage period. Observers note that the spiritual preparation – fasting, prayer, and communal gatherings – may have contributed to a temporary cooling of hostilities. Reactions across Nigeria and the continent Within Nigeria, the Katsina peace deal has sparked a lively debate. Civil society organisations such as the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) commend the pragmatic approach, arguing that “peace is rarely achieved through zero‑tolerance policies alone.” Conversely, the Nigerian Bar Association’s northern chapter warned that “allowing armed groups to retain weapons sets a dangerous precedent for the rule of law.” In Ghana, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited the agreement as a case study during a regional security forum in Accra, suggesting that “context‑specific incentives may be more effective than blanket disarmament mandates.” South Africa’s Department of Defence, meanwhile, highlighted the need for robust monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance. Across the Sahel, where banditry and insurgency have destabilised large swathes of territory, the Katsina model is being watched closely. In Mali and Burkina Faso, where peace talks have stalled, officials have expressed curiosity about whether a similar “food‑first” strategy could be adapted to local realities. Challenges and the way forward Despite early signs of reduced violence, the Katsina peace deal faces several hurdles. First, the verification of compliance remains weak. The state relies on community reports and occasional patrols, but there is no independent monitoring body. Second, the continued possession of arms means that any breach of the agreement could quickly reignite large‑scale attacks. Third, the economic sustainability of the biscuit allowance is uncertain. With Nigeria’s inflation rate hovering above 20% in 2026, funding the programme may strain the state budget, especially if other crises – such as flood relief in the Niger Delta – demand resources. Finally, the psychological impact on civilians cannot be ignored. While some villagers feel safer seeing bandits buying food, others remain fearful, recalling past betrayals. Trust‑building initiatives, such as joint community‑bandit dialogues and youth empowerment projects, are essential to cement the gains. What the future holds for bandit‑state negotiations Looking ahead to 2027, experts predict that the Katsina peace deal could evolve into a phased disarmament plan. If the biscuit programme proves effective for another six months, the state may introduce a “weapon‑exchange” component, offering additional cash incentives for surrendered firearms. International donors, including the European Union and the African Development Bank, have signalled willingness to fund capacity‑building for local security forces, provided that human‑rights safeguards are respected. Such support could enable a more structured verification system, reducing the risk of relapse. For now, the image of a bandit clutching a biscuit while looking toward Mecca remains a powerful reminder that peace in Nigeria’s north is as much about meeting basic human needs as it is about political will. FAQ What is the main provision of the Katsina peace deal? It allows a bandit group to receive monthly food supplies and to travel for Hajj while keeping their weapons, in exchange for halting attacks on civilians. Why were biscuits chosen as the food item? Biscuits are non‑perishable, affordable, and culturally familiar, making them an easy way to provide consistent humanitarian assistance. Has the deal reduced violence? Early reports indicate a drop in kidnappings and cattle rustling in the first three months, though comprehensive data is still being gathered. For more on the story, see the original coverage by The Nigerian Scam. Related Reading Kaduna Gov Uba Sani Deploys 43 Vehicles to Boost Security Operations Trump Proposes a Luxury Camp David‑style Retreat at His Florida Golf Club Israel Marks October 7 Anniversary Amid War, Grief and Political Turmoil Related posts: Banditry, Kidnappings and Governance Gaps: a 2026 Reality Check on Nigeria’s North-west Crisis Kano Police Nab 79 Suspects, Recover Weapons After Takutaha Festivities Root Causes of Terrorism and Insurgency in Nigeria — DSS DG Breaks It Down Sokoto Bandit Attack: 5 Killed, 3 Injured as Armed Groups Strike Again Post navigation Inside Martell’s Afrobeats Limited Edition XO: Davido Meets Prince Gyasi Moji Afolayan Says She’ll Never Marry a Man Who Plans a Second Wife
