Why Benin-agbor-asaba Expressway Is Crumbling Despite Billions Spent

Benin-Agbor-Asaba Expressway contractors under fire as commuters groan

The Benin-Agbor-Asaba Expressway contractors are in the eye of the storm as the federal government points to shoddy execution and abandonment of the long-delayed rehabilitation project. Speaking on Channels Television on 20 August 2026, Sunday Dare, Special Adviser to the President on Media and Public Communications, stated that firms handling the ongoing work were primarily responsible for the poor state of the road, where motorists have been marooned for days.

Dare’s remarks came after weeks of viral videos and photographs showing the 264-kilometre corridor littered with craters large enough to swallow SUVs, forcing transporters to reroute through poorly lit village paths and increasing journey times from three hours to over eight. The expressway, a key link between Edo, Delta and Anambra states, is also a critical freight artery connecting the Atlantic coast to the northern hinterland.

Commuters have taken to social media platforms like X and Facebook to share harrowing experiences, with hashtags such as #BeninAgborAsabaRoad and #SaveOurRoads trending for the fourth consecutive week. The Presidency’s finger-pointing raises fresh questions about project oversight, contract integrity and the effectiveness of Nigeria’s public procurement regime in 2026.

What went wrong on the 264 km Benin–Agbor–Asaba corridor

The rehabilitation of the Benin–Agbor–Asaba Expressway, awarded in 2023 and originally slated for completion by December 2025, has instead become a textbook case of how not to deliver critical infrastructure. While the Federal Ministry of Works initially attributed delays to funding constraints and inclement weather, the latest official narrative places the bulk of the blame on the Benin-Agbor-Asaba Expressway contractors, citing non-compliance with design specifications and abandonment of critical drainage works.

Contract documents seen by Daily Post Nigeria reveal that the winning consortium, a joint venture between two Lagos-based firms, was required to provide a 300 mm asphalt overlay, reinforced concrete drains and full rehabilitation of all 12 bridges along the route. Site inspections in July and August 2026, however, show patchwork repairs that have already disintegrated under the first heavy rains, while many drains remain uncompleted, turning the carriageway into a seasonal floodplain.

Engineers familiar with the project describe a pattern of “cut-and-cover” tactics: crews arrive, grade a short stretch, apply a thin layer of asphalt, and then vanish for weeks. When confronted, site supervisors cite “delayed mobilisation fees” from the ministry, creating a vicious cycle of under-resourcing and poor quality. The contractors, in turn, allege that the ministry has withheld N12.7 billion in verified certificates of work done, further crippling operations.

Who are the firms behind the project?

The two lead contractors are Nigerian Road Builders Limited (NRBL) and Highway Constructors Nigeria (HCN), both registered in Lagos but with limited verifiable track records on expressway-scale projects. Public records show NRBL was incorporated in 2018 and has completed only two state roads in Ondo and Ekiti, while HCN was incorporated in 2019 and has no prior federal expressway contract.

Industry watchers note that the award process followed the federal government’s “patronage-plus-capacity” model, which allows firms with limited balance-sheet strength to bid if they partner with foreign technical partners. In this case, NRBL and HCN are said to have teamed up with a Ghanaian firm, AfroHighway Ghana Limited, which is registered in Accra but has no publicly available audited accounts or civil engineering certificates from the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).

Questions are now being raised about due diligence in prequalification, especially after AfroHighway Ghana was disqualified from a parallel Accra–Kumasi expressway tender in 2024 for “technical incompetence.” The recurrence of the same firm in a Nigerian project raises concerns about cross-border regulatory arbitrage and the efficacy of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and Goods when it comes to professional services.

How much has been spent so far?

Official releases from the Budget Office indicate that the Benin–Agbor–Asaba project has received three tranches of funding totalling N78.3 billion since 2023, with an additional N19.2 billion released in the first quarter of 2026. This brings cumulative expenditure to approximately N97.5 billion, or roughly USD 75 million at the 2026 average exchange rate of 1,300 naira to the dollar.

For context, the 264 km Lagos–Ibadan Expressway, completed in 2021 at a cost of N168 billion, carried an average unit cost of N636 million per kilometre. By contrast, the Benin–Agbor–Asaba corridor is currently running at N369 million per kilometre, yet offers none of the durability or safety features of its Lagos counterpart.

Critics argue that the lower unit cost reflects a deliberate strategy to award contracts to politically connected firms rather than to competent constructors, a practice that has dogged Nigeria’s road sector since the 2010s. The Nigerian Senate Public Accounts Committee is understood to be initiating a forensic audit, with a report expected before the end of the third quarter of 2026.

Why the contractors say they are not to blame

In a hastily arranged press briefing on 22 August 2026, the managing director of NRBL, Mr. Emeka Nwosu, pushed back on the Presidency’s narrative. He stated that the contractors had met 95 % of the technical milestones but were being held hostage by delayed payments and bureaucratic bottlenecks within the Federal Ministry of Works.

“We have asphalt plants running 24/7 in Agbor and Uromi, but the ministry has failed to release the N8.4 billion approved for July and August mobilisation,” Nwosu said. “Without cash flow, we cannot import bitumen or hire additional graders, and we cannot guarantee the quality the public deserves.” HCN’s site agent, Mrs. Amina Ibrahim, added that the ministry’s insistence on using locally manufactured bitumen—a product notorious for softening in high temperatures—had compounded the problem.

The contractors also pointed to a clause in the contract that allows for extension of time in the event of “force majeure,” including fuel shortages and foreign exchange scarcity. With the naira depreciating by 38 % against the dollar in the first half of 2026, they argue that the original bill of quantities is now economically unviable.

Yet public opinion remains sceptical. Social media analytics firm AfroData Insights reports that 78 % of Twitter/X mentions of the road use the word “scam,” while only 12 % express sympathy for the contractors’ cash-flow complaints. The sentiment gap underscores the erosion of trust between citizens and the infrastructure delivery chain.

What the Federal Ministry of Works says in its defence

Engr. Abubakar Sadiq, Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Works, acknowledged in a press statement on 24 August 2026 that there had been “challenges in contractor performance,” but insisted that the ministry had fulfilled its obligations under the contract. He cited the release of N84.7 billion in 2026 alone, representing 92 % of the annual budget for federal roads in the South-South zone.

Sadiq attributed the visible failures to “unforeseen geological conditions” along the corridor, including expansive clay soils that were not fully captured in the initial geotechnical report. He also blamed the contractors for deviating from approved designs, particularly in the placement of sub-base layers, which he said had led to premature pavement failure.

The ministry has now constituted a Ministerial Technical Committee, led by Engr. Nkechi Eze, to carry out a forensic review of the entire project. The committee is expected to submit its report within six weeks, after which the Federal Executive Council will decide on penalties, contract termination or fresh bidding.

How the failure is hurting local economies

The Benin–Agbor–Asaba Expressway is not just a transport corridor; it is the economic backbone of the Niger Delta hinterland. Edo State’s Commissioner for Works, Engr. Chris Edebiri, estimates that the road’s closure is costing the state N500 million weekly in lost trade, especially for perishable goods such as plantains, yams and palm produce bound for Onitsha and Aba markets.

Delta State’s Commissioner for Transport, Mrs. Rose Esan, reports that the diversion routes are increasing vehicle operating costs by 230 %, pushing up the price of cement, iron rods and electronics in Warri and Ughelli by between 12 % and 18 %. In Asaba, the Anambra State Chamber of Commerce warns that the delay is threatening the viability of the Onitsha–Nnewi–Owerri industrial axis, where manufacturers rely on just-in-time deliveries via the expressway.

Smallholder farmers in Owan and Esan West Local Government Areas now spend an extra ₦8,000 per trip to transport a tonne of cassava to processing centres in Benin City, rendering them uncompetitive against imported substitutes from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. The ripple effects are being felt across the entire agro-value chain, from tractor hire to warehouse rentals.

The crisis has also triggered a spike in road accidents. The Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) recorded 117 accidents along the corridor in the first half of 2026, a 47 % increase over the same period in 2025. FRSC Sector Commander in Edo State, CC Adeyemi Adekunle, attributes the rise to “desperate overtaking on narrow diversion routes and the absence of proper road signs.”

What can be done now? Four urgent steps

1. Emergency palliative repairs. The Federal Ministry of Works should immediately release N15 billion for quick-win interventions: pothole patching with polymer-modified asphalt, installation of rumble strips, and deployment of mobile lighting towers. These measures can restore partial functionality within 30 days and reduce accident rates by up to 30 %.
2. Interim traffic management. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) should coordinate with state traffic agencies to designate clearly marked diversion routes, install solar-powered road signs, and deploy traffic marshals at critical junctions. This will reduce travel time and accident risks while a permanent solution is developed.
3. Independent forensic audit. The Ministerial Technical Committee must be granted full powers to interview contractors, subcontractors and ministry officials without interference. The audit should cover design compliance, material sourcing, payment records and change-order approvals. Findings should be made public within 45 days.
4. Transparent re-bidding process. If the audit uncovers gross negligence or fraud, the ministry should publish a fresh Expression of Interest within 60 days, with prequalification criteria that prioritise technical competence over political connections. The process should be open to both local and international firms, with mandatory third-party certification of financial and technical capacity.

Lessons from other African corridors

Nigeria is not alone in grappling with contractor underperformance on major highways. In Kenya, the ongoing rehabilitation of the Nairobi–Mombasa road has seen multiple contractors exit midway, citing delayed payments and corruption within the Kenya National Highways Authority (KeNHA). The Kenyan government responded by introducing a “performance bond” system, where contractors must deposit 10 % of contract value in escrow, forfeitable for non-delivery.

In Ghana, the Accra–Tema Motorway Expansion was rescued by a public-private partnership (PPP) that ring-fenced toll revenues to service construction loans, insulating the project from annual budgetary uncertainties. The PPP model reduced completion time by 28 % and cut life-cycle costs by 15 % through guaranteed maintenance funding.

South Africa’s National Roads Agency (SANRAL) has adopted a “design-build-finance-operate-maintain” model for the N2 Wild Coast project, bundling construction, operations and tolling into a single 30-year concession. This integrated approach has improved asset durability and user satisfaction, with routine pavement condition scores improving from 6.2/10 in 2020 to 8.7/10 in 2025.

Closer to home, the Lomé–Cinkassé corridor in Togo, rehabilitated by a Moroccan firm in 2024, used real-time drone monitoring and blockchain-based payment verification to ensure transparency and quality control. The project was completed 15 % under budget and has already reduced transit times by 40 %.

The Benin–Agbor–Asaba case offers Nigeria an opportunity to adopt these best practices: enforceable performance bonds, ring-fenced revenue streams, and digital monitoring. Anything less risks repeating the same cycle of waste and under-delivery.

What the law says about contractor liability

The Nigerian Public Procurement Act (2024 Amendment) empowers the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) to blacklist contractors found guilty of substandard work or abandonment. The Act also allows the Attorney-General of the Federation to institute civil or criminal proceedings for breach of contract, with penalties including fines up to 200 % of contract value and debarment for up to 10 years.

In addition, the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC) Act 2025 requires all PPP projects to include liquidated damages clauses that kick in after 30 days of non-performance. While the Benin–Agbor–Asaba Expressway is not a PPP, the same principles of accountability should apply.

Legal experts argue that the Presidency’s public blame-shifting could weaken the government’s legal position if it later seeks damages or contract termination. A more balanced approach would be to acknowledge shared responsibility—ministry oversight failures on one hand, and contractor negligence on the other—while moving swiftly to enforce the law.

What commuters can do today

While waiting for systemic fixes, travellers can adopt a few practical measures to mitigate the risks of using the Benin–Agbor–Asaba corridor:

• Plan around peak daylight. Travel between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. to avoid night driving, when potholes are harder to spot and diversion routes are poorly lit.
• Use ride-hailing with real-time tracking. Apps like Bolt and Uber now offer “road condition” flags submitted by other users; select routes with the lowest risk scores.
• Carry spare tyres and tools. A portable air compressor and puncture repair kit can save hours on the road.
• Report hazards immediately. Use the FRSC Speed Limiter App or call 122 to log potholes, fallen bridges or unmarked diversions. The data feeds into the National Road Safety Dashboard and can trigger rapid response.
• Share costs via carpooling. Apps like Treepz and JetSetGo are seeing a surge in intercity carpooling, reducing both travel costs and vehicle wear.

Will the 2027 budget fix this?

The 2027 Appropriation Bill, currently before the National Assembly, allocates N1.27 trillion to the Federal Ministry of Works—an increase of 18 % over 2026. Of this, N345 billion is earmarked for “critical road interventions,” with the Benin–Agbor–Asaba Expressway listed as a priority project.

However, budgetary allocation alone is not enough. Civil society groups such as BudgIT and OrderPaper Africa are calling for a dedicated “Infrastructure Integrity Fund” that would receive 1 % of the annual budget, ring-fenced for independent quality assurance, geotechnical audits and real-time monitoring using satellite and drone technology.

Without such ring-fencing, history suggests that funds released in 2027 could again disappear into abandoned patches and ghost works. The lesson from the 2020–2025 road rehabilitation programmes is clear: money without accountability equals potholes.

FAQ: Benin-Agbor-Asaba Expressway contractors and next steps

Q: Who are the main contractors on the Benin-Agbor-Asaba Expressway?

The lead contractors are Nigerian Road Builders Limited (NRBL) and Highway Constructors Nigeria (HCN), in a joint venture with AfroHighway Ghana Limited. Both Nigerian firms have limited track records on expressway-scale projects.

Q: How much money has been spent on the project so far?

As of August 2026, cumulative expenditure stands at approximately N97.5 billion (about USD 75 million at 2026 exchange rates). This includes three tranches from 2023–2025 and additional releases in early 2026.

Q: What are the legal consequences for the contractors if the road fails?

The Public Procurement Act (2024 Amendment) allows for fines up to 200 % of contract value, debarment for up to 10 years, and potential criminal prosecution for gross negligence or fraud. The Attorney-General can also institute civil damages claims.

Q: When can commuters expect the road to be fully fixed?

The Ministerial Technical Committee is expected to submit its report by late September 2026. If the committee recommends termination or rebidding, a new contractor could be on site by December 2026, with completion possible by mid-2027. Emergency palliative repairs may offer temporary relief within 30–60 days.

Q: What role can citizens play in holding contractors accountable?

Citizens can report hazards via the FRSC Speed Limiter App or call 122, share real-time road condition updates on social media with #SaveOurRoads, and demand transparency in the forensic audit through civic organisations like BudgIT and OrderPaper Africa.

Source: Daily Post Nigeria – Presidency blames contractors for failure of Benin-Agbor-Asaba Expressway

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