Money politics in Nigeria is not a new complaint, but when it comes from a former president it lands differently. Speaking at the Paul Alaje Colloquium, Goodluck Jonathan made the case that Africa’s most populous country cannot reclaim the respect it once commanded abroad until the selection of leaders stops functioning as an auction. His argument, as reported by Punch, is blunt: patronage and cash have replaced competence as the currency of Nigerian politics, and the world has noticed. The remark is easy to dismiss as familiar sermonising. It is harder to dismiss when you consider who is saying it — a man who once occupied Aso Rock and who, in 2015, handed power to an opposition party in an act that earned Nigeria genuine international goodwill. That contrast is the heart of the story, and it is why the speech deserves more than a headline. What Jonathan actually said, and why it landed Jonathan’s central claim is simple enough to fit on a poster: a country that sells its leadership cannot expect to be taken seriously by those it wants to trade with, borrow from or sit beside at international tables. He tied the problem directly to the way candidates emerge — through patronage networks, delegate economics and the quiet arithmetic of who can fund a campaign rather than who can run a ministry. For a former president to say this publicly is significant, because the machinery he describes did not appear overnight and did not belong to one party. It was built over successive election cycles by politicians across the spectrum, and it has outlasted every administration that promised to dismantle it. Jonathan’s intervention therefore reads less like an accusation against any single government and more like a warning about a system that has become self-sustaining. There is also a personal dimension that gives the message weight. The 2015 transfer of power was widely praised internationally precisely because it was orderly and because the incumbent accepted a result he could have contested. That moment bought Nigeria a measure of credibility that money cannot purchase — and Jonathan’s point is that such credibility is spent quickly when subsequent contests are decided by wallets rather than voters. Why money politics in Nigeria costs the country global respect Reputation is not an abstraction in international affairs; it is a pricing mechanism. Investors, lenders, development partners and foreign governments all read governance signals before they commit capital or sign agreements. When the route to public office runs through private wealth, those observers draw a reasonable conclusion: that contracts, appointments and policy may be for sale, and that the rules can change with the highest bidder. The consequences compound quietly. A country perceived as transactional pays more to borrow, attracts shorter-term capital, and struggles to convince partners that its commitments will survive a change of personnel. Diplomats can negotiate treaties, but they cannot negotiate away the reputational discount that comes with a political class seen as purchasable. There is a softer cost too, and it is felt most keenly by Nigerians abroad. Diaspora communities carry the burden of explaining their country at dinner tables and in boardrooms, often defending a nation they love against a caricature built from its worst political habits. When a former president says the country must end money politics in Nigeria to regain respect, he is speaking to that exhaustion as much as to policy analysts in Abuja. None of this means Nigeria is uniquely corrupt — patronage exists in every democracy. What distinguishes the problem is scale and visibility: the cost of seeking office, the expectations placed on aspirants by party structures, and the speed with which campaign spending is recovered after victory. That visibility is what shapes the international verdict. The patronage machine: how leadership selection became a bidding war To understand why the problem persists, follow the money backwards. A candidate who spends heavily to secure a party ticket owes favours before the general election even begins. Those favours are typically settled through appointments, contract awards, budget allocations and the protection of allies from scrutiny. The result is a government that spends its first year paying political debts rather than delivering services. Party structures sit at the centre of this economy. Where internal democracy is weak, delegates and party officials become the real electorate, and their support has a price. Aspirants who cannot raise that price are filtered out long before voters see a ballot paper, which is one reason Nigerian politics skews towards wealth and age and away from competence and youth. The damage is not only ethical. When the criterion for advancement is fundraising capacity rather than managerial ability, the quality of public administration suffers across the board — from procurement to project supervision to the negotiation of complex contracts. Weak institutions then become the excuse for more centralised control, which in turn creates more patronage to distribute. It is a loop that feeds itself. Jonathan’s framing points to the exit: break the loop at the point of selection. If parties cannot sell tickets and candidates cannot buy delegates, the downstream incentives change dramatically, because the return on political investment collapses when office no longer guarantees access to public resources. What ending money politics would actually require Speeches do not dismantle machines. If the goal is genuinely to reduce the role of cash in Nigerian politics, the work has to happen in specific, unglamorous places. Campaign finance rules that are enforced, not merely written Nigeria’s electoral framework, including the 2022 Electoral Act, sets out spending limits and disclosure expectations for candidates and parties. The gap has always been enforcement. Disclosure returns that are filed and never audited, limits that are breached without consequence, and expenditure routed through third-party groups all undermine the intent of the law. A credible regime would require an empowered regulator, published donation records and penalties that actually bite. Internal party democracy Most money politics in Nigeria is decided before the general election, inside party primaries. Transparent, verifiable and consistently applied nomination rules — ideally with independent oversight of delegate lists and voting — would do more to reduce the influence of cash than any public awareness campaign. Parties that cannot reform themselves should expect external regulation, because they are performing a public function. Institutions willing to say no Courts, electoral officials, anti-corruption agencies, auditors and the media all act as brakes on the system. Where any of these is captured or simply slow, the brakes fail. Strengthening them is slow work, but it is the only durable route: a candidate who knows that a purchased result will be overturned in court has far less reason to spend. A cheaper political economy The cost of contesting office in Nigeria is itself a barrier to entry and a driver of corruption. Reducing nomination and expression-of-interest fees, capping campaign expenditure in practice, and providing modest public financing tied to compliance would widen the field. So would stricter rules on the use of state resources and official platforms for campaigning. Citizens who refuse the transaction Vote-buying survives because it is accepted. Community-level vigilance, secret-ballot discipline, and a willingness to report inducement rather than celebrate it are unglamorous but decisive. Where voters treat cash as compensation for a broken system, they inadvertently renew the contract that keeps the system broken. A continental mirror: what the rest of Africa is watching Nigeria’s problem is not uniquely Nigerian, and that is precisely why the speech travelled. Across West, East and Southern Africa, debates about campaign finance disclosure, the cost of primaries and the influence of wealthy patrons recur with striking regularity. Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Senegal have all grappled publicly with questions of how political money is raised, disclosed and spent, with varying degrees of success. This matters because regional norms are contagious. When one large democracy tightens its rules and enforces them, neighbouring states face pressure to follow; when the biggest economy shrugs, the excuse for inaction spreads. Nigeria’s size gives it an outsized role in shaping what is considered normal practice on the continent, whether it wants that role or not. Continental and regional bodies have increasingly emphasised governance standards in their peer-review processes, and African publics are more connected than ever to comparisons across borders. A Nigerian reform effort that visibly worked would be studied in Accra, Nairobi and Johannesburg. A speech alone would not. The 2027 test and the cost of waiting Attention now turns to the next general election cycle, due in 2027, when parties will again select candidates for thousands of positions. That selection season — not the campaign itself — is where the money politics question will be answered in practice. If ticket prices rise and delegate lists remain opaque, the rhetoric will have changed nothing. There is a cost to delay that is rarely counted. Every cycle in which wealth determines access pushes capable Nigerians further from public service and deepens public cynicism, which in turn makes it easier for the next round of inducement to work. Rebuilding trust is slower than losing it, and the country has been losing it for a long time. Jonathan’s contribution, whatever one thinks of his own record, is to name the mechanism rather than the symptom. Ending money politics in Nigeria is not a moral crusade; it is an institutional repair job with a measurable return — in better appointments, stronger contracts, steadier policy and a reputation that no longer needs defending abroad. Frequently asked questions What did Goodluck Jonathan say about money politics in Nigeria? Speaking at the Paul Alaje Colloquium, the former president argued that Nigeria must end money politics and patronage in the selection of leaders if it is to restore its international reputation. He linked the country’s diminished global standing to a system in which cash and connections, rather than competence, determine who holds office. Why does money politics damage Nigeria’s reputation abroad? Foreign investors, lenders and governments read governance signals when deciding whether to commit capital. A political system seen as purchasable raises perceived risk, encourages short-term investment, and weakens confidence that agreements will survive changes in leadership. It also undermines the diplomatic credibility Nigeria needs to influence regional and global decisions. Can Nigeria’s electoral laws stop vote-buying and excessive campaign spending? Laws can help, but only if they are enforced. Nigeria’s electoral framework sets spending limits and disclosure expectations, yet weak auditing, unpunished breaches and spending routed through third parties limit their effect. Enforcement capacity, published donation records and meaningful penalties matter more than new legislation. What can ordinary Nigerians do to reduce the influence of money in politics? Voters can refuse inducement, protect the secrecy of the ballot, report vote-buying, and scrutinise party primaries rather than focusing only on the general election. Civil society groups and the media also play a role by publishing campaign finance information and holding parties to their own nomination rules. Is money politics a uniquely Nigerian problem? No. Patronage and costly campaigns are features of politics in many African and global democracies. What stands out in Nigeria is the scale, the visibility, and the extent to which spending is recovered through public resources after victory — which is why reform efforts are watched closely across the continent. 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